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government. As this example demonstrates, construction of a co-
herent, useful, grand theory is possible. 
3. Is Construction of an Uncontroversial Grand Theory 
Possible? 
Here the answer must be no. Any grand theory will reflect 
fundamental premises about the proper role of government and the 
appropriate function of courts. These premises are likely to be con-
troversial; moreover, as premises, they are not susceptible to logical 
proof. Therefore, the grand theories generated by the premises will 
inevitably be controversial as well. 
Here again, the minimal representation theory provides an in-
structive example. The theory rests on two premises. First, that 
effectuating the decisions of a properly chosen legislature is invaria-
bly of paramount importance to the legal system. And second, that 
even in the absence of an explicit constitutional mandate, the courts 
are the appropriate agency to police the legislative selection process. 
Nearly everyone rejects the first premise; some, including most 
originalists, disagree with the second. Thus we would all reject the 
minimal representation theory. Because our reasons involve basic 
premises, however, none of us would be demonstrably either right 
or wrong in doing so. 
* * * * 
Although Tushnet fails in his effort to totally discredit the 
search for grand theories of constitutional law, his analysis contains 
important lessons for those who would construct such theories. 
Grand theorists must be more precise, both in specifying their 
premises and describing the content of the theories themselves. 
Such precision will not end the debate over the theories; it will, 
however, at least make clear what the debate is about. 
FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN. By Raoul 
Berger. I Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press. 
1987. Pp. viii, 223. $16.95. 
Donald 0. Dewey 2 
Professor Raoul Berger says he came reluctantly to his advo-
cacy of states' rights. He was somewhat embarrassed by the com-
pany he had to keep, for he had long associated the doctrine with 
I. Professor of Law Emeritus, Harvard University. 
2. Dean of Natural and Social Sciences, Professor of History, California State Univer-
sity. Los Angeles. 
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"Southern condonation of lynchings, with official oppression of 
blacks, and with demagogues who duped their constituents." 
Once he took the plunge, however, he landed on his feet, run-
ning, and forged to the forefront among the states' righters. Feder-
alism: The Founders' Design is a convenient little handbook for 
those who defend states' rights, whether on the political platform, 
in the classroom, or in the courtroom. Professor Berger presents 
his case in 201 pages of text, with 854 footnotes. The book is so 
thoroughly annotated that a fourth of its pages contain more foot-
notes than text. The first six chapters are tightly organized and 
march relentlessly and quite impressively forward. The last three 
chapters are quite another matter, as I will try to show. 
"Dual Federalism" would have been a fitting title for Berger's 
book, if he had been willing to show his hand at the outset. In the 
same vein, his subtitle, "The Founders' Design," could profitably 
have replaced "Introduction" as a heading for Chapter One. He 
argues there that the wishes of the Founding Fathers-the writers 
and ratifiers and, to a lesser extent, their contemporaries-should 
prevail. Indeed, "it is established learning that what the Constitu-
tion meant when it left the hands of the Founders it means today." 
Characteristically, he berates the "unelected, unaccountable, and 
virtually irremovable" Supreme Court for usurping power from the 
people by changing federalism to limit the states' authority. 
Berger argues convincingly that the states were sovereign and 
independent prior to the establishment of the Union. He neglects to 
mention that this deprives Abraham Lincoln of his basic argument 
against the constitutionality of secession. Ironically, the only refer-
ences to Lincoln show him as an advocate of state sovereignty, a 
sterling example of what can be achieved by selective quotation. 
Having established that the states were not created by the nation, 
Berger next argues for dual sovereignty, a term not often heard 
these days. National supremacy, he argues, means only that the 
central government is supreme within its "limited and defined 
sphere." 
Berger devotes several chapters to specific sections of the Con-
stitution, reclaiming the tenth amendment from what he regards as 
an unjustifiably dusty shelf, and reining in the rampant fourteenth 
amendment, the necessary and proper, the supreme law, the general 
welfare, and, especially, the commerce clauses. He even attempts to 
demonstrate that John Marshall's McCulloch v. Maryland decision 
and Alexander Hamilton's national bank message of 1791 did not 
extend national powers, but merely sought appropriate means to 
implement delegated powers. 
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Having contrived to place Marshall on the side of the states' 
rights angels, Berger yanks him back when he comes to the com-
merce clause. Because Gibbons v. Ogden "long has cast a shadow 
over exposition of the commerce clause," Berger holds Marshall 
largely responsible for opening the door to national interference 
with state prerogatives, especially concerning moral issues. 
If Berger had been content to stop there, he would have had a 
tightly argued little book (or at least booklet) which would be ac-
cepted as gospel by the "originalists" and as a large burr under the 
saddle of the "revisionists." Instead he proceeds with chapters 
which are as extraneous as they are contentious. One is a six-page 
summary of what he has written elsewhere on the fourteenth 
amendment. He does not repeat there his concession in Government 
by Judiciary that it would be "utterly impossible to undo the past." 
Next is a vigorous protest against the Supreme Court's ruling in 
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (1985) that 
municipal transportation becomes a federal concern by virtue of the 
commerce clause. This chapter appears to be a "This is the last 
straw!" addition to a book that was already written; it is one of the 
few places where a significant number of recent citations occurs, 
and earlier in the book he referred to 1983 decisions as occurring 
"the day before yesterday." 
The conclusion and the appendix on original intention con-
tinue the debate with reviewers who were critical of his earlier writ-
ings. He expresses contempt for academicians who are so eager to 
right social wrongs that they encourage the judiciary to become, in 
effect, a constitutional convention by ignoring the wishes of the rati-
fication conventions of 1788. 
Berger's bibliography is surprisingly dated. Even though some 
of the vintage histories he uses are timeless, a lot of good history has 
been written, with new interpretations, since his sources were pub-
lished. More disturbing is his reliance on early editions of docu-
ments which have been partially supplanted by definitive pub-
lications in the last two decades. Although The Papers of James 
Madison (William T. Hutchinson eta/., eds.) and The Documentary 
History of the Ratification of the Constitution (Merrill Jensen et. a/., 
eds.) are not yet completed, they cover much of the ground impor-
tant to Berger's thesis and they cover it much better than his 
sources, a 1900-1910 edition of Madison's Writings and Jonathan 
Elliot's 1836 Debates of the ratification conventions. Each volume 
in The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution 
published to date has at least a full column of index citations on the 
state-nation relationship, and Volume I (1976) has two-and-one half 
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pages! Berger is, himself, the most frequently cited author in his 
bibliography, even without counting the citations to five reviewers 
of his books. 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed.). By Lau-
rence M. Tribe.1 Mineola, New York: Foundation Press. 
1988. P.p. 1778. $38.95. 
Stanley C Brubaker 2 
In their response to the Supreme Court nomination of Robert 
Bork, the leading lights of the legal academy gave proof, if such 
were needed, that constitutional jurisprudence in America has been 
transformed. Of all the so called "extremist" positions for which 
Bork was pilloried before the Senate Judiciary Committee, not one 
lacked support from a liberal giant of yesterday, such as Herbert 
Wechsler, Hugo Black, or Bork's own mentor, Alexander Bickel. 
Yet at Bork's nomination hearings last fall, the legal academy pas-
sionately and overwhelmingly opposed him. Leading the charge 
was Laurence Tribe, Tyler Professor of Constitutional Law at 
Harvard Law School. 
Contemplating Professor Tribe's career, former Harvard Dean 
Erwin Griswold doubted if any legal scholar off the Court "has ever 
had a greater influence on the development of American constitu-
tional law." Perhaps an overstatement, but at forty-seven years of 
age, Tribe has compiled an impressive record. He has written or 
edited a dozen books and scores of influential articles; a leading 
casebook in constitutional law cites his commentaries nearly fifty 
times (more than twice the number for Bickel).3 He has won nine 
of the twelve cases he has argued before the Supreme Court. He has 
smooth relations with the media, and is their most frequently 
quoted source on constitutional questions. And he has close ties to 
liberal politicians, including some presidential aspirants. 
With his scholarly credentials, press relations, and political 
connections, Tribe weighed in heavily against the Bork nomination. 
He devised legal arguments for Democrats on the Judiciary Com-
mittee, rehearsed them in marathon sessions with Chairman Joseph 
I. Tyler Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard University. 
2. Associate Professor of Political Science, Colgate University. This review is adapted 
from "Rewriting the Constitution," originally published in Commentary magazine, Dec. 
1988, p. 36. 
3. G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SL'I'STEIN, and M. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
(1986). 
